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THE research noted in this report, which is thefirst ever study of the issues it addresses,suggests that:
n The Big Four firms of accountants do not ac-
curately report all the jurisdictions in which they
work, although PwC come close to doing so. We
found that they operate in 186 jurisdictions in all
with an average of 3.41 offices per jurisdiction;
n The Big Four have offices in 43 of the 53 se-
crecy jurisdictions identified in this report;
n It is difficult to establish precisely how many of-
fices each of the Big Four firms have but what is
clear is that the size of their operations in a juris-
diction is not always proportional to its population
or GDP. The Big Four have more staff in Luxem-
bourg in proportion to the size of the local popula-
tion than in any other country; the Cayman Islands
come second in this ranking and Bermuda third;
n We have not been able to accurately locate all
the staff employed by the Big Four. In the case of
EY we were only able to identify where 83 per cent
of their staff work;
n A case study on the legal structure of KPMG
could not identify the legal ownership of its offices
in 55 jurisdictions;
n Despite the Big Four having central manage-
ment organisations, the firms all claim to be net-
works of independent entities that are said to be
legally unrelated to each other.
We suggest that the structure adopted by the Big
Four firms of accountants, which at one level sug-
gests the existence of a globally integrated firm and
at another suggests that they are actually made up
of numerous separate legal entities that are not
under common ownership but which are only
bound by contractual arrangements to operate
common standards under a common name, has
been adopted because it:
n reduces their regulatory cost and risk;
n ring-fences their legal risk;
n protects their clients from regulatory enquiries;
n delivers opacity on the actual scale of their op-
erations and the rewards flowing from them. 
These advantages can be secured by these firms
because the regulation of auditing and the supply
of taxation services is devolved by the EU to mem-
ber states even though, as this report shows, the
supply of three services is dominated by what ap-
pear, for all practical purposes, to be multinational
corporations. 
We suggest that in an era where transparency is
seen as fundamental to accountability it is inappro-
priate for the world’s leading auditors to be almost
wholly opaque on their operations and to provide
no effective reporting on their own activities when
they play a fundamental role in the regulation of
global capitalism. 
To counter the risk that these structures impose
on society we suggest that firms organised in this
way:
n Should be defined as being under common
control, and so are single entities for group ac-
counting purposes within the European Union;
n Should be licenced as single entities for audit
and taxation purposes throughout the European
Union;
n Should be required in due course to separate
entirely their audit and other professional services
but until this is possible should be required to ring-
fence the two from each other worldwide as a con-
dition of being licenced to provide such services in
the EU; 
n Should, as a condition of those licenses, be re-
quired to prepare worldwide group consolidated fi-
nancial statements which must be published on
public record;
n Should ensure that those consolidated financial
statements include full public country-by-country
reporting.
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THERE has been considerable debate aboutsecrecy jurisdictions in recent years, ignitedby leaks such as the Panama Papers. These
revealed the extent of tax avoidance and illicit fi-
nancial flows by wealthy individuals, including
prominent political figures, and large corporations.
In light of this, questions are being raised on how
to improve regulation targeting tax avoidance and
money-laundering strategies, as well as increasing
transparency of the places and actors who enable
and promote these strategies. 
This report provides evidence
of the opacity that surrounds
the activities of the world’s Big
Four firms of accountants, who
it shows to be active in secrecy
jurisdictions. They are, in order
of size, Deloitte, Pricewater-
houseCoopers or PwC, EY
(until recently Ernst & Young),
and KPMG.
As this report notes, these
firms dominate the audit mar-
ket for all the world’s major cor-
porations. For example,
between them they audit all but two of the FTSE
100 companies registered in the UK, and all but 10
of the FTSE 350 companies1. They are also eco-
nomically significant in their own right: their com-
bined sales revenue exceeded €120bn in 2016. Of
this sum €43bn was earned from audit and assur-
ance services, almost €28bn from tax services and
€49bn from consulting. Between them they em-
ployed 887,695 staff in 2016 whilst appearing to
operate, in our estimate, in 186 jurisdictions. It also
appears that they make exceptional profits: for ex-
ample, the average Big Four partner in the UK
earned in excess of £500,000 (€625,000) in 2016.
Having noted the above, we have now made ref-
erence to much of the available financial data that
these firms want the world to know about their
global operations. Such is their ability to create
opacity that they have been very successful at pre-
venting further information about their operations
being made available for anyone to easily appraise. 
Our interest in these firms is based on the fact
that auditing firms play a significant role in our
economy through the trust placed in them to report
on the truth and fairness of the financial statements
of firms to regulators and investors. The fact that
they play an important role in tax havens, or se-
crecy jurisdictions as we prefer to call them2, just
adds to curiosity about the activities of these firms. 
Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 various
attempts have been made to improve the trans-
parency of the world’s major corporations to assist
public understanding of the
risks that they create and to
improve their accountability
for the activities that they un-
dertake. One of these devel-
opments has been
country-by-country reporting,
which demands that each
global entity accounts locally
for the activity that it under-
takes. The research in this re-
port used part of the
methodology of country-by-
country reporting to seek to
determine just where the Big
Four accounting firms are, how much use they
make of secrecy jurisdictions, what their local op-
erations are called and how many people they em-
ploy in each place where they have an office. No
attempt was made to establish local financial re-
sults – the prospect of success was too limited as
the firms do not generally disclose this information. 
Substantial effort was required to find the data on
offices and personnel. This was not helped by the
fact that none of the firms publish absolutely accu-
rate lists of where they are located, although PwC
comes close. Deloitte and KPMG both appear to
make mistakes on this issue in their own Trans-
parency Reports. In every case there was some
under-reporting. 
Overall our results suggest that these firms oper-
ate 2,916 offices in 186 locations in the world, with
an average of 3.4 offices in each jurisdiction where
they work. The firms say that they employ a total
of 887,695 staff in these locations; we found that
the most by far were in the USA. 
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As a result of our work we were able to locate the
jurisdictions where 808,176 (91 per cent) of these
people work using a variety of research methods.
Our lowest success rate (82.9 per cent) was for EY,
which appears to be by far the most secretive of
the firms.
Of the 186 locations where the firms are found 43
were secrecy jurisdictions. This total represents 81
per cent of all secrecy jurisdictions identified for re-
search purposes in this report. A total of 9.9 per
cent of the staff of the Big Four firms that we could
locate work in secrecy jurisdictions. The firm with
the largest secrecy jurisdiction representation by
number of locations is KPMG, which is present in
40. Our findings suggest that the Big Four firms are
over-represented in secrecy jurisdictions when their
presence is weighted by either local population or
the jurisdiction’s GDP. On average, the number of
staff employed in an office in a tax haven was al-
most double that for an office
in a non-secrecy jurisdiction
small state. 
With regard to ownership
structures, a case study was
undertaken on KPMG. This
showed that the ownership of
its network members is not al-
ways disclosed in the locations
in which it is active. 
It is our suggestion that the
Big Four, and other networks
of professional services firms,
adopt an opaque ownership structure with the re-
sult that they are unaccountable. It seems likely
that there are advantages to doing so beyond the
benefits that opacity itself provides. 
The first of these advantages is to limit their reg-
ulatory risk. The structure they use means that their
activity in each place only has responsibility to local
regulators. This simplifies and limits these firms’ li-
abilities.
Secondly, by splitting themselves into legally
unassociated parts, these forms seek to limit their
legal risk in the event of failure on the firms’ part.
Finally, the splitting up of their operations means
that these firms protect their clients from enquiry
by authorities from outside the particular jurisdic-
tion from which services are supplied. 
In our opinion these firms’ limitations of risk,
whether for themselves or their clients, imposes
costs on society at large. As a result we make four
recommendations aimed at improving the trans-
parency and accountability for these firms through
regulatory changes. 
The first recommendation is that these firms be
split so that their audit and other activities (includ-
ing tax) are separated in the future. Only if this hap-
pens can the very obvious conflicts of interest
currently inherent within them be addressed. Dur-
ing the transition to this split we recommend that
the audit and other activities of these firms be ring-
fenced from each other worldwide as a condition
of the grant of audit licences to their EU based net-
work members. 
Secondly, we suggest a reform aimed at improv-
ing transparency because these firms do not pub-
lish accounts for their group of networked entities
as a whole at present. We suggest that these net-
worked groups of firms must
be considered to be single
entities under common con-
trol for EU regulatory pur-
poses and so be required to
file a single set of consoli-
dated financial statements for
their global operations. This
will require, at most,  a minor
change in the EU legal defini-
tion of a group so that work-
ing under a common identity
with common, contractually
enforceable standards be-
comes a definition of a group
within the financial services sector. 
Thirdly, we suggest that the same firms be re-
quired to apply for a single licence to provide audit
and taxation services of any sort throughout the
EU, as a condition of which they will be required to
comply with the accounting recommendations we
suggest. 
Fourthly, to support this regulatory process and
to hold these networks of professional service firms
to account, we recommend that they be required
to file full country-by-country reports on public
record.
The Big Four are key to the operation of global
capitalism but fail that responsibility. The recom-
mendations this report makes would change this
so that they account for their actions in every lo-
cation in which they operate.
July 20175
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3. BACkground: the Big 4
In this chapter we provide background information on who the Big Four firms of accountants
are and what they do as well as providing information on the scale of their operations and
that of their competitors so that the significance of their role in the regulation of global
capitalism can be properly understood. 
A. THE CONTExTTHE Big Four are firms that are traditionally thought to be accountants, but the reality isthat they make most of their income from a broader range of activities includingauditing (or assurance services, as they prefer to call them), advisory services (which
covers a wide range of consulting and other services) and tax-related activities. The firms in
question are Deloitte3, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)4, KPMG5 and EY6 (until recently
known as Ernst & Young). 
The reality is that the Big Four firms are central to the operation of global capitalism. This
form of capitalism is dependent upon the logic of shareholder capital being accountably
used by management, which is distinct and separate from those who own the enterprise,
and whose actions are reviewed by independent auditors. This system could not function
without the audit services that the Big Four firms provide. These firms are, then, quasi-
regulators at the heart of the global financial system and yet we know remarkably little about
them. This presents a clear paradox: the accountability of global capitalism is dependent
upon firms that enjoy significant opacity about their own operations. 
This may not be significant in itself but for the fact that these firms are widely known to
operate in many secrecy jurisdictions. It is estimated that between US$7.6 trillion7 and $21
trillion8 of wealth is held in secrecy jurisdictions. If this is only possible because the apparent
depositories for this illicit wealth can secure the local tax and audit services of the Big Four
firms in the secrecy jurisdictions where these funds are reported to be located, then it
follows that the operations of the Big Four firms are at the heart of the tax-haven world. The
scale of their operations in these places needs to be known and properly regulated. 
B. THE SIzE OF THE FIRMS
A summary of the global income of these four firms, broken down between their three
main activities, is as follows (reported in US dollars since that is the currency that they use
for reporting purposes9):
To illustrate the extent to which these four firms dominate the market, the next two largest
firms are BDO and Grant Thornton, which had global turnovers of $7.6bn and $4.8bn
respectively. The difference in scale between the Big Four and all their competitors is readily
apparent. 
Table 1 – Income by acTIvITy
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The global spread of this income as reported by the firms is as follows:
7
Table 2 – Global sPread of Income
Sources: As above. Note: only PwC provides the breakdown noted in italics.
This global spread is also apparent when their staff numbers are considered. The firms report these
to be as follows:
Table 3 – Workforce by ProfessIon
Table 4 – Workforce Global breakdoWn
Sources: as above. July 2017
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To put this data in context, BDO have a global headcount of 67,73110 and Grant Thornton employ
42,000 people11. The Big Four are substantially bigger than their competitors in terms of staff.
C. THE OPACITY
It is important to note the above data, to a very large degree, provides all the available financial
information that these firms wish to supply to us. These firms do not publish accounts for their
organisation as a whole because, as is noted later in this report, they claim that no such global
organisation exists. 
The consequence is that we do not know their global profits, nor do we know information
regarding their financial stability. It is also the case that country-by-country reporting, as explained
later in this report, does not apply to their activities in its current form. What all of this means is that
these firms enjoy levels of opacity denied to many of their multinational corporation clients. The
remainder of this report is, then, a study of opacity. 
D. THE ExCEPTIONS, AND THE ExCEPTIONAL PROFITS
The exception to this opacity only arises locally where, if required by local law, local representatives
of these firms publish their annual financial statements. As an example of this local reporting, the
following data is published by the UK Big Four member firms, each of which uses a limited liability
partnership structure and as a result is required to put their financial statements on public record:
Table 5 – Uk fInancIal daTa
This data can be interpreted as follows: 
Table 6 – Uk ProfITs Per ParTner
Sources: See endnote12.
The rewards for partners in these firms are exceptional. The average staff cost includes social
security and pension costs and as such are likely to be at least 20 per cent greater than actual salary
payments. Even so, average salaries in each firm are at least double the UK average of £26,624 per
annum13. This implies that the advantages these firms have, coupled with their global spread, lets
them earn exceptional profits without explaining much about how, where and why this happens. 
In this chapter we summarise the research approach that we have adopted in this study and
the links to country-by-country reporting. The form this research has taken has been inspired
by the accounting requirements of country-by-country reporting, which is one of the initiatives
promoted to explain the use made of secrecy jurisdictions and other locations. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY reporting was first proposed by civil society14 in 2003 and wasadopted by the OECD in 2015 as part of Action 13 of its Base Erosion and Profit ShiftingAction Plan15. Country-by-country reporting is also likely to be required by EU regulation
in due course, although the precise form of this regulation is as yet unknown16. The full detail
of what country-by-country reporting demands is not of concern here except to note that it
requires a multinational corporation to disclose for every jurisdiction in which it operates:
n That it has a presence in the jurisdiction;
n What the names of its subsidiaries in that place might be;
n What those subsidiaries do in the locations in question;
n How many people it employs in that location;
n Limited financial data including its sales, profits before tax, tax due and paid and net
investment.
We were aware, as already noted, that the financial data required for country-by-country
reporting purposes would not be available for the vast majority of locations in which the Big
Four firms had offices and pragmatically decided not to pursue this line of enquiry as a result. 
We also assumed that data on what the Big Four might do in each location in which they
operate would be similar, as proved to be true during the countless visits we made during this
research to their remarkably consistent national websites wherever they are located around
the world. The other three variables, however, appeared worthy of investigation. 
Precisely because all of the Big Four firms have been extensively engaged in lobbying and
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4. reseArCh ApproACh
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In this chapter we explain why it is important to know where each of the Big Four operates
the methods that we used to determine that and the conclusions that we draw which
suggest:
n The Big Four forms do not reliably report where they operate;
n They have a significant presence in secrecy jurisdictions;
n This presence in secrecy jurisdictions is hard to justify based on the GDP or population
of the secrecy jurisdictions where they have offices;
n It is likely as a result that their presence in these locations is very largely related to the
offshore financial services sector that is located in these places. 
A. METHODOLOGYEACH of the Big Four firms provides an office directory on their website18. In each casethe directory indicates the country in which the firm works and then the individual officelocations within that jurisdiction. These directories were the starting point for our work
in identifying the places in which the firms work.
For each country for which a firm said it had a location, we then tried to determine the
number of offices that it had in the country in question. This was not always straightforward.
Firstly, the number appears to be fluid: the data noted in this report is that which we could
establish in March 2017. The data was different from that established by an initial survey in
September 2016. Secondly, whilst EY simply listed one address per city, Deloitte on
occasion listed many. This required some judgment on occasion to decide when there may
be duplicate entries per location. Both KPMG and PwC also exhibited that problem in some
locations. Lastly, when we found countries in which the firm did not list an office in its global
office directory (which was the case for all firms) we undertook web searches to determine
how many city locations there may be where there were offices in the jurisdiction in question.  
In each case we also checked the claims made in the office directories in a number of
alternative ways. One was to check the Transparency Reports that each firm now produces
on a global, and sometimes local, basis. Some of these had differing lists of locations in
which the firms worked, as noted below. 
In addition, as part of our work on the number of staff employed by these firms in each
country in which they operate (see section four of this report) we also undertook extensive
July 2017 10
advising on country-by-country reporting17 we decided that to use the criteria it suggests are
appropriate as the best way to appraise the global scale of the Big Four and the disclosure
they make on this issue. 
Our research then focused on:
n In which jurisdictions the Big Four have offices;
n How many offices they have in each such location;
n How many staff they have in each jurisdiction;
n What information they disclose on the ownership of their local operations.
5. Big 4 oFFiCe loCAtions
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web-based searches of LinkedIn and other sites that provide information on this issue,
looking at information published by the firms themselves and also as reported in other
media. Where such searches indicated discrepancies with the office directories that the
firms published we sought to investigate the issue until we could be sure as to whether the
firm had a real presence in otherwise undisclosed jurisdictions or not. 
B. FINDINGS
We found that not one of the Big Four firms published a wholly reliable list of their offices,
as this summary of our findings shows:
July 201711
Table 7 – offIces Per JUrIsdIcTIon
Give or take (and as we demonstrate, a degree of tolerance is required) the Big Four firms
operate in a total of 186 jurisdictions with an average of 3.41 offices in which they are
located. 
It is important to note that the firms’ claims noted above vary on occasion. KPMG fairly
consistently claims to have 152 offices19. Deloitte says20 it has 150 but lists just 140 in its
global office directory21 (albeit whilst making it clear that some jurisdictions are combined).
EY list 155 locations in its global office directory22. PwC says it is in 157 locations23. 
Of these varying claims and the disparities that we note, PwC’s is most easily explained
and is due to the fact that it treats the Channel Islands as one jurisdiction when they are two
(Jersey and Guernsey). 
In other firms the discrepancies were greater. For example, in the case of KPMG we found
a location (Gabon) where it says it operates but we can find no evidence of it having an
office there. We also found locations where KPMG does not suggest it has an operation in
its 2016 international annual review but where it is, nonetheless, present based on evidence
from the web. In three cases (Afghanistan, Greenland and Cuba) these appeared to be
simple omissions from both its international annual review and the KPMG website of
international offices. 
In contrast, the KPMG Antigua and Barbuda office was mentioned in the 2016 KPMG
international annual review but not on the KPMG international locations listing. The office in
Syria managed the reverse, being included in the international locations website but not in
the 2016 international annual review. In addition a number of locations are not listed in
KPMG’s 2016 international annual review because of what appears to be confusion as to
their status. Hong Kong, Macau, Bonaire, Puerto Rico and some French territories appear to
fall into this category although there appears to be no such concern with listing the UK’s
the Big Four – A study oF opACity
Crown Dependencies as independent territories. The overall result is that we think KPMG
may operate in 161 locations and not the 152 it usually suggests. 
We found similar issues with Deloitte. For example, Tanzania and the Palestinian Ruled
Territories (as Deloitte refer to them) are in the website listing of locations where Deloitte says
it has offices but are not in the international transparency report published by the firm even
though they definitely appear to operate in both locations. In direct contrast, Rwanda,
Burundi, Turkmenistan, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Northern Marian Islands, the
Marshall Islands and Palau are all listed by Deloitte in its international transparency report
but not on the Deloitte website of global office locations. This may be because – with the
exception of Rwanda, where there definitely is an office – the location is actually served from
another jurisdiction and the presence referred to in the international transparency report may
be little more than a PO Box address. 
Finally, to complete the identified differences, Deloitte definitely appears to operate in Syria,
Afghanistan, Bonaire and the Solomon Islands but these locations do not appear on the
firm’s website list of locations served or in its international transparency report. The result is
that we think they are in 157 locations, which is fewer than the transparency report suggests
but more than the website implies. 
In the case of EY the issue is slightly more complicated because the firm is, in general,
much more secretive than the other three firms. In this case we compared the global office
list the firm publishes on its website with our own
online research and the disclosure the firm
makes to the UK-based Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales, which
regulates its auditing activity in that country, of its
affiliated firms and where they operate24. The
comparison revealed one location (Myanmar)
which was disclosed for regulatory purposes but
not on the EY website. 
It also revealed 11 locations where the local
firm was run from another location. For example,
EY Liechtenstein is recorded as being part of EY
Switzerland. There were, however, also offices
which were on the EY website list of locations
but for which there was no disclosure made to
the UK regulator, including offices in Afghanistan,
the Dominican Republic, Laos, Qatar, Equatorial
Guinea, Jersey, Guernsey, Aruba and Greenland.
Some of these may also be branch offices. For example, Jersey and Guernsey may be part
of the UK operation of EY, but this is not clear from the disclosures made. 
In addition, we were unable to determine whether there was an office in Ethiopia, for which
some evidence existed, and Sint Marteen, which may be a branch address for which we
also found some evidence. This leaves some ambiguity about the number of locations in
which EY may actually operate; the result we report is our best estimate based on the
available evidence. 
Based on our findings of where we best think these firms have offices the world map in
Figure 1 indicates the global presence of the Big Four. As is clear, the overwhelming majority
of countries in the world have at least three out of the four firms present, and all four are
present in most countries. 
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fIGUre 1 – bIG foUr Global Presence
Colours indicate how many of the Big Four firms are present in each country
Firms
0
1
2
3
4
Mere presence in a location can, however, be misleading. Figure 2 shows the number of
offices by location:
fIGUre 2 – bIG foUr offIces by locaTIon
Colours indicate the number of offices Big Four firms have per country
Firms
not present
1-10
10-25
25-50
50-100
100-200
200-324
The disparity between the two maps makes clear that the Big Four only have a limited
presence in many of the lower-income countries in the world. 
Figure 3 further illustrates this point, showing the top 25 countries in terms of the number
of offices operated by the Big Four in aggregate. The USA tops this list and, as is clear, with
the exception of Malaysia, the jurisdictions where the Big Four have most offices are in the
OECD and BRICS countries. 
the Big Four – A study oF opACity
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fIGUre 3 – bIG foUr ToP JUrIsdIcTIons
top 25 jurisdictions by total number of offices
It may be unsurprising that the Big Four are heav-
ily represented in the largest economies and that
their presence in many of the world’s poorest ju-
risdictions is limited but their over-representation
in Nordic counties requires explanation. In these
countries, alone in the world it seems, these firms
provide services to the entire business community,
whatever its size, and as such are located in many
towns as well as major cities. So strong is this
trend that the Big Four firms have 23 offices be-
tween them in Iceland, a country of just 336,000
people.
Figure 3 suggests on first glance that the pres-
ence of the Big Four firms is directly linked to the
size of the market in the place in which they oper-
ate. To test whether is the case we compared the
number of offices to market size measured in
terms of population and GDP. The evidence that
emerged was clear: the number of offices the Big
Four operate in a jurisdiction is not proportional to
the size of a country or its economy. Figure 4
shows the number of Big Four offices in a jurisdic-
tion per head of population: 
fIGUre 4 – bIG foUr offIces vs PoPUlaTIon
top 25 jurisdictions relative to population size
With the exception of the Nordic states, for which
explanation has already been offered, the presence
of secrecy jurisdictions in this list is its most obvi-
ous characteristic. The implication is clear – the Big
Four firms are heavily over-represented in these lo-
cations in proportion to apparent local market size.   
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The same trend was apparent when we com-
pared office presence with GDP with the exception
that, Iceland apart, the Nordic countries disap-
peared from the list and secrecy jurisdictions be-
came even more prominent:
fIGUre 5 – bIG foUr offIces vs GdP
top 25 jurisdictions by relative to gdp size
Table 8 – secrecy JUrIsdIcTIon Presence
Overall the firms are in 43 secrecy jurisdictions
between them out of the list of 53 such locations
in total that we used for research purposes, as ex-
plained in the appendix to this report. 
From these results it is apparent that the Big Four
are heavily over-represented in secrecy jurisdic-
tions, as compared to what could be expected
from relying on GDP or population figures. This
suggests that their presence in these places is re-
lated to the secrecy for transactions that these ju-
risdictions provide. 
As a result we subjected these firms’ use of se-
crecy jurisdictions to further review. Using a tax
haven listing based on the secrecy component of
the Tax Justice Network Financial Secrecy Index
(see the appendix to this report for further details)
we found the following data:
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Table 9 – bIG foUr offIces In secrecy JUrIsdIcTIons (conTInUed)
C. CONCLUSIONS
The Big Four accounting firms are present in 186 countries worldwide. 
Most of their activities, however, as evidenced by office and staff presence, seem to be in
the world’s larger economies. 
That said, when controlling for the size of the economy (whether by population or GDP)
the Big Four firms are disproportionately active in secrecy jurisdictions. 
“
From these results it is
apparent that the Big Four are
heavily over-represented in
secrecy jurisdictions, as compared
to what could be expected from
relying on gdp or population
figures. this suggests that their
presence in these places is related
to the secrecy for transactions that
these jurisdictions provide
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In this chapter we extend our analysis of the Big
Four firms by seeking to determine where their staff
are located to provide a better indication of the
scale of their activities in each jurisdiction in which
they work. As a result we suggest:
n While we can locate a majority of the staff for
each of the Big Four firms we are unable to do so
entirely for any firm;
n There are a significant number of locations
where we are unable to determine the number of
staff present for each firm. In most of these cases
the numbers involved will be relatively small; 
n The number of people employed by the Big
Four firms in secrecy jurisdictions appears dispro-
portionate to local need;
n It appears that staff employed in these loca-
tions are largely engaged in meeting the needs of
clients not located in those secrecy jurisdictions. 
A. METHODOLOGYTHE number of offices that a firm maintains ina location is clearly one indicator of the scaleof its operations, but not a wholly adequate
one since an office could in principle be just a few
people, or a large-scale operation. In fact, we
found offices of fewer than 10 people when under-
taking our research, and others with thousands. As
a result we researched the total number of staff
employed by each firm in each jurisdiction in which
they worked on the basis that this would be a bet-
ter indicator of the scale of its activities.  
In many cases the local web page of a firm pro-
vided the information that we needed on the num-
ber of staff (and sometimes partners) engaged in a
jurisdiction. When this data was not available we
tried to secure the necessary information on em-
ployee numbers in the firms’ transparency reports,
sustainability reports, annual reports or in the re-
cruitment material they publish. 
Success here was sporadic: for example, in one
case where staff numbers were not listed any-
where else, a recruitment video opened with infor-
mation on the number of people employed by the
firm. 
When no data was available on a firm’s website
we checked its LinkedIn page instead; there were
a surprising number of occasions when firms that
appeared deeply secretive on their own web pages
were remarkably candid with data on LinkedIn.
These combined sources we describe as primary
data for research purposes.
When neither the web page nor the direct
LinkedIn description gave us the staff numbers, we
sought alternative sources, noted below as sec-
ondary. These included newspaper articles, de-
scriptions from top employer awards, job listings,
Facebook pages and the personal resume of an
HR official. 
Finally, if none of these type of sources could be
found, but the company provided data in a range
on LinkedIn, we resorted to using the mid-point in
the range they suggested appropriate - meaning
that if, for example, a LinkedIn listing for the firm
suggested it had between 51 and 200 employees,
we recorded it as having 125. This, inevitably,
means our findings are approximate in some
cases.
The proportion of staff we were able to locate for
each firm by the different means noted above were
as follows:
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As is apparent, we had by far the greatest diffi-
culty in locating EY staff. It seems that they have a
more secretive approach to personnel matters
compared to the other firms. 
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B. FINDINGS
By taking advantage of different sources, we
were able to locate a significant proportion of the
global staff number for each firm. The number of
staff we have been able to allocate to jurisdictions
for each firm is as follows:
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Table 10 – ProPorTIon of offIces WITh sTaff daTa
More broadly, our findings showed that 43 per
cent of total Big Four staff worldwide are situated
in the G7 economies. The top 25 locations for
numbers of employees in aggregate are as follows:
fIGUre 7 – ToP 25: ToTal nUmber of emPloyees
The proportion of total Big Four employees rela-
tive to population size, however, reveals a very dif-
ferent picture, as was the case with the analysis of
office presence. Figure 8 shows the top 25 juris-
dictions according to the ratio of employees to
population in a jurisdiction. Again, secrecy jurisdic-
tions are prominent on this list. 
fIGUre 8 – ToP 25: emPloyees To PoPUlaTIon sIze
“
secrecy jurisdictions are
prominent on this list of
the top 25 jurisdictions
according to the ratio of
employees to population in a
jurisdiction
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If the number of staff of the Big Four firms in aggregate is compared with GDP in a location
the top 25 jurisdictions are as follows:
fIGUre 9 – ToP 25: nUmber of sTaff vs GdP
These rankings show very clearly the same pattern that office
numbers revealed: while most of the Big Four staff are located in the
largest economies, these firms seem to have disproportionately more
staff – and therefore presumably disproportionately more activity – in
countries that are known to be secrecy jurisdictions. Bolivia is a
surprising exception: Deloitte apparently have more than 
2,000 staff in the country. 
As discussed above, this over-representation is 
not explained by the size of the market as proxied 
by population and GDP. As a result we presume 
that it is the secrecy provided by these places that 
prompts the Big Four to have such a strong 
presence within them. 
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A further analysis of our results is as follows:
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Table 11 – ProPorTIon of sTaff In secrecy JUrIsdIcTIons
Table 11 shows that whilst we were successful in finding most of the staff of the Big Four
firms, many jurisdictions did not have this information available anywhere. The implication is
that these places are likely to have relatively small offices. From the staff numbers that we
have we are able to estimate that around 10 per cent of the Big Four firms’ employees are
located in secrecy jurisdictions. 
Looking at the number of staff per office reveals this pattern in terms of non-secrecy
jurisdictions and secrecy jurisdictions: 
Table 12 – sTaff Per offIce In secrecy vs non-secrecy JUrIsdIcTIons
Table 12 shows that while the average number of offices per secrecy jurisdiction is
lower than in non-secrecy jurisdictions, these offices are more heavily staffed, as the
average number of staff is much higher across all four firms. 
To make sure we were not biasing our findings against smaller countries (which we
considered to be those jurisdictions with populations of less than 3 million) we also
tested the data for all such places, representing 112 locations in total of which 40
were secrecy jurisdictions. 
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The following was found:
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Table 13 – sTaff In smaller coUnTrIes & secrecy JUrIsdIcTIons
As Table 13 shows, the small size of many secrecy jurisdictions does not explain the
relative over-representation of the Big Four firms. While the average number of offices is
slightly lower in non-secrecy jurisdiction small countries, the number of staff per office is
significantly larger in the small countries with high secrecy. 
The difference in the pattern of operations is apparent: there are more, but smaller, offices
in non-secrecy jurisdiction locations. We suggest that this is because they are likely to
service local need rather than an international clientele.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Our research could not, despite the effort expended, locate all the staff of the Big Four
firms. We were as a result unable to determine the true scale of their operations in many
countries in which they operate.
We were, however, able to conclude that these firms are heavily over-represented in
secrecy jurisdictions and the Nordic countries. Around 10 per cent of their staff are located
in secrecy jurisdictions. 
It is unlikely that local business can justify this scale of activity in secrecy jurisdictions.
Indeed, the 579 employees we can identify that Deloitte, PwC and KPMG engage between
them in Cayman (no figure was available for EY) may represent at least two per cent of that
island’s working population. It is very unlikely that local demand could justify such a
concentration of accounting expertise.
“
it is unlikely that local business can justify
this scale of activity in secrecy jurisdictions.
indeed, the 579 employees we can identify
that deloitte, pwC and kpmg engage between
them in Cayman may represent at least 
two per cent of that island’s working population
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In this chapter the organisational structure of
KPMG (which was the subject of a case-study) is
considered. As a result we suggest:
n KPMG has an organisational structure that is
legally based in Switzerland but operationally lo-
cated in the Netherlands;
n This international organisation is made up of
58 firms; it would appear that the member firms in
other countries are sub-licensees of these 58 firms,
although further information on this structure is not
available;
n The identity of the KPMG firm operating in 55
jurisdictions could not be determined. These were
mainly in smaller locations. They had 91 offices be-
tween them;
n The result is that it is not possible to be sure
from the readily available information published by
KPMG precisely how the firm is structured and
what the legal identify of its affiliated entity in which
location where it operate might be. 
A. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGYTHE structure of the Big Four firms is an issuethat has been quite surprisingly under-re-searched. We too did not, unfortunately, have
the time or resources to address this issue in-
depth. Instead a review of the structure of KPMG
has been undertaken to illustrate the issues that
may need to be addressed by a broader study25.
In the process passing reference is made to the
structures of Deloitte, PwC and EY26. 
All the Big Four firms of accountants have broadly
similar structures. Each has a central organising
body that appears to control its intellectual prop-
erty, licence members of the network and enforce
common standards. Three of the Big Four locate
the company responsible for this activity in Lon-
don. 
The companies in question are Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu Limited27, a UK private company limited
by guarantee that regulates the Deloitte network28;
PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited29,
which is again a UK private company limited by
guarantee, for PwC30 and yet another such com-
pany, Ernst & Young Global Limited31 for EY32. 
The use of these similar structures is not by
chance: UK companies limited by guarantee have
a particular appeal for these networks for three rea-
sons. Firstly, such companies are, in effect, mutual
entities, and are often used by charities or non-
trading clubs and societies for this reason. Be-
cause membership does not result in a right to
receive income, changes of ownership rarely give
rise to capital gains tax charges, meaning that the
tax situation when there are membership changes
is simple. 
Secondly, if a company is organised in this way it
is easy to argue that the firm does not trade but
just undertakes mutual activities on behalf of the
members that should not then be subject to UK
tax. These companies appear to take advantage
of this opportunity. 
Thirdly, as a result, the accounting disclosures re-
quired by UK law are minimal: the latest PwC ac-
counts for the noted company only just extend
onto a second page. The whole structure is, there-
fore, very convenient for these firms. A UK base,
UK law, and very convenient UK tax arrangements
can all be taken advantage of and yet almost noth-
ing need be disclosed as to what these companies
really do. 
Despite this KPMG does not use such a com-
pany. In its case the coordinating entity is a Swiss
cooperative33 called KPMG International Coopera-
tive.  Bloomberg34 suggests that this entity is reg-
istered at the KPMG office in zurich35. Other
sources suggest that it is registered in the Swiss
Canton of zug36. 
Based on the survey undertaken for this report
every single KPMG firm mentions this Swiss entity
on its website. The relationship is also described
in the Transparency Reports that some of those
KPMG firms publish. For example, the KPMG firm
in Luxembourg says in its Transparency Report (in
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a statement remarkably similar to those in many
other such reports) that37:
“
The independent member firms of the KPMG
network (including KPMG Luxembourg, So-
ciété coopérative) are affiliated with KPMG In-
ternational, a Swiss cooperative which is a legal
entity formed under Swiss law.
KPMG International carries on business activities
for the overall benefit of the KPMG network of
member firms but does not provide professional
services to clients. Professional services to clients
are exclusively provided by its member firms.
The structure is designed to support consistency
of service quality and adherence to agreed values
wherever in the world the member firms operate.
One of the main purposes of KPMG International
is to facilitate the provision by member firms of high
quality Audit, Tax and Advisory services to their
clients. For example, KPMG International estab-
lishes and facilitates the implementation and main-
tenance of uniform policies and standards of work
and conduct by member firms and protects and
enhances the use of the KPMG name and brand.
The implication is clear: there is a unity within this
structure and yet at the same time there is a con-
siderable degree of separation within the firm. That
this separation may not be as stark as the legal
wording implies is suggested by the job titles of
those working for the global operation, such as
‘Global Head of Audit’ and ‘Global; Head of Advi-
sory’38. These suggest a degree of coordination in
such activities that is contrary to the impression of
a diversely controlled firm39. The substance of the
firm may not, in other words, be what the form im-
plies.
There is other evidence of this conflict between
the substance and form of the firm. For example,
the actual operational structure of KPMG may be
a little more complex than the published state-
ments suggest: it appears that the functional con-
trol of KPMG internationally actually rests in the
Netherlands. This is the international address pro-
vided for KPMG International supplied by the UK-
based KPMG LLP as part of its regulatory filings40.
Despite this, remarkably little attention or publicity
is given to this operation. The 2016 KPMG global
annual review gives no hint, for example, of a con-
tact address for this head office operation, despite
which it appears to have considerable power. As
the entirely typical Luxembourg Transparency Re-
port41, already noted, says:
“
KPMG is the registered trademark of KPMG
International and is the name by which the
member firms are commonly known. The
rights of member firms to use the KPMG name and
marks are contained within agreements with
KPMG International. 
In these agreements, member firms commit
themselves to a common set of KPMG Values.
Under agreements with KPMG International, mem-
ber firms are required to comply with KPMG Inter-
national’s policies and regulations including quality
standards governing how they operate and how
they provide services to clients. This includes hav-
ing a structure that ensures continuity and stability
and being able to adopt global and regional strate-
gies, share resources, service multinational clients,
manage risk, and deploy global methodologies and
tools. Each member firm takes responsibility for its
management and the quality of its work.
The report goes on to list the sanctions available
for use by KPMG against non-compliant member
firms. The resulting paradox is readily apparent:
KPMG is structured as if it is made up of individual
member firms and yet each of these has to operate
to common standards that are rigorously enforced.
There are also common financial interests: KPMG
firms, for example, share a common captive pro-
fessional indemnity insurance operation (whose lo-
cation has not at present been identified). Despite
this, all is also not apparently equal within the
KPMG organisation. As the same Luxembourg
Transparency Report notes when discussing the
KPMG governance structure:
“
The key governance and management bod-
ies of KPMG International are the Global
Council, the Global Board, and the Global
Management Team.
The Global Council focuses on high-level gover-
nance tasks and provides a forum for open discus-
sion and communication among member firms. It
includes representation from 58 member firms that
are ‘members’ of KPMG International as a matter
of Swiss law. Sub-licensees are generally indirectly
represented by a member.
This reference to there being 58 core members
is intriguing. It makes clear that there are tiers of
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membership within the KPMG structure that are
not at all apparent to the public. It also suggests
that KPMG’s operations in more than 100 coun-
tries may actually be operated under sub-licence
from other jurisdictions, although which operations
have which status is not clear. 
This two-tier structure may be particularly impor-
tant when considering KPMG’s secrecy jurisdiction
operations. These do not appear to play any sig-
nificant part in KPMG’s governance structure. For
example, the current global board42 has what ap-
pear to be firm representatives from the USA, UK,
Netherlands, Switzerland, Mexico, Republic of
Korea, Japan, Italy, Ireland, India, Germany,
France, China, Brazil and Australia. Canada repre-
sents the Americas board, Singapore the Asia Pa-
cific board and Spain the European and Middle
Eastern board. Four other representatives repre-
sent the rest of the firm, with members represent-
ing Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, Central
and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States that were formerly part of the
USSR. 
Two things are apparent as a consequence. The
first is that some firms appear to be more equal
than others, as the licencing arrangement referred
to above implies. The second is that secrecy juris-
diction locations appear to be largely absent from
these governance structures. This may imply that
the regulation of these sub-licenced KPMG prac-
tices is undertaken from non-secrecy jurisdiction
locations. This may be a precedent for the regula-
tion of activity in these locations by other parties.  
B. FINDINGS
I. FIRM LOCATIONS
The suggestion that each KPMG operation was
independent from those others bearing a similar
name was tested during the course of the review
of the website of each member firm undertaken as
part of this work. 
The work undertaken identified a KPMG pres-
ence in 161 countries involving at least 738 offices.
KPMG usually suggests it has 152 locations43.
Reconciliation of these claims was not a straight-
forward exercise. 
As noted in Chapter 5, one country (Gabon) iden-
tified as having an office by the 2016 KPMG inter-
national annual review website does not appear to
have a KPMG office44. 
Other countries (Afghanistan45, Greenland46, and
Cuba47) where KPMG appears to definitely have
operations are not mentioned in either the 2016 in-
ternational annual review website or in the KPMG
international locations listing48. 
Antigua and Barbuda49 is mentioned in the 2016
international annual review website but not on the
KPMG international locations listing. 
Syria50 manages the reverse status: being in the
international locations website but not in the 2016
international annual review website.
Six locations are not listed in the 2016 interna-
tional annual review because of what appears to
be confusion as to their status. Hong Kong,
Macau, Bonaire, Puerto Rico and some French ter-
ritories appear to fall into this category although
there appears to be no such concern with listing
the UK’s Crown Dependencies independently.
It would be of obvious benefit if KPMG was able
to consistently decide and disclose where it oper-
ates because this does not happen at present. 
Our findings on where KPMG is located are sum-
marised as follows:
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II. FIRM OWNERSHIP
In the case of 106 websites, each representing a
different national firm, a named local entity was
identified as the local KPMG firm, it then being
stated that KPMG International, based in Switzer-
land, was the international organisation of which it
was a member. The firms in question represented
648 (87.7 per cent) of KPMG offices and 95.2 per
cent of all KPMG staff.
In the case of KPMG Azerbaijan the local opera-
tion was managed by a firm located in another ju-
risdiction. KPMG Azerbaijan Limited is a company
incorporated in Guernsey51.
The structure of some operations where owner-
ship is stated is not always clear. A case in point is
KPMG India, where the website52 makes clear that
ownership is by an Indian partnership but where
the Transparency Report53 says:
“
KPMG is a partnership firm registered under
the Indian Partnership Act 1932. The two legal
partners in KPMG are two companies incor-
porated in the Netherlands: KPMG International In-
vestments BV (a wholly owned subsidiary of
KPMG International Cooperative) and KPMG Ad-
visory NV (a company which is part of the KPMG
Europe LLP group of companies). However, both
such companies hold the interests in KPMG ulti-
mately for, and at the direction of, KPMG Interna-
tional Cooperative, a Swiss cooperative which is a
legal entity formed under Swiss law (“KPMG Inter-
national”).
Notwithstanding the legal ownership structure,
KPMG International and/or the legal partners do
not manage or exercise control over the manage-
ment of KPMG or extract profit from KPMG. 
There also appear to be a number of regional
firms. KPMG East Africa, which is incorporated in
Mauritius, operates a number of KPMG offices.
The offices in a group of mainly Dutch Caribbean
locations also appear to be under common con-
trol. The small KPMG office in the British Virgin Is-
lands appears to control the KPMG office in St
Lucia. 
Whether the offices of KPMG in the Channel Is-
lands are one or two firms is not clear: one seems
to be likely. The operation of some of the KPMG
Offices in the Balkans is undertaken by locally lo-
cated companies but these are then subsidiaries
of a company called KPMG CEE Limited, a com-
pany incorporated in Cyprus. 
More importantly, in 55 locations the website
does not say what entity is representing KPMG in
the jurisdiction in which an office is located. In
these cases the website almost invariably refers to
the website being operated by KPMG International
but with no local entity being identified. 
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These locations represent 91 offices (12.3 per
cent of the total) but just 4.8 per cent of identified
staff, although it should be noted that there is a
much higher incidence of being unable to identify
staff working in these locations than in those in
which ownership can be determined. 
The largest of these offices where ownership is
unclear is in Brazil; there appears to be a general
culture of secrecy that is quite marked in South
American affiliates. 
The fact that KPMG does not disclose who all of
its member firms are means that large parts of the
KPMG network appear to be publicly unaccount-
able, which is unacceptable for an organisation of
its global significance. 
III. USE OF PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURES
The tradition within the accountancy profession
is that firms are organised as professional partner-
ships. This, however, has been
subject to fairly rapid regulatory
and cultural change in many juris-
dictions since around the turn of
the century. This research sug-
gested that a partnership struc-
ture is still in use in just 21 KPMG
locations representing 62 offices,
or just 8.4 per cent of all offices.
Unlimited liability for auditors ap-
pears to be receding.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
KPMG is a paradox. For market-
ing and public perception pur-
poses it appears to wish it to be
believed that it is a deeply con-
ventional, centrally controlled and
remarkably homogenous organi-
sation. However, it then goes on
to suggest that its national oper-
ations are subject to separate ownership, although
the identities of many of these separate entities are
not publicly disclosed. The implications of this cho-
sen structure are, however, profound.
As KPMG LLP’s  UK regulatory filings54 suggest,
the maintenance of a local operation means that
regulatory obligations can be geographically cur-
tailed. The firm is only registered to provide serv-
ices in the UK, Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man,
Japan and the USA. This saves on costs.
Legal risk is also ring-fenced by the chosen struc-
ture: in principle the failing of one member firm –
whether for financial reasons due to operational dif-
ficulties or, perhaps more likely, as a result of cata-
strophic liability arising as a result of a successful
professional negligence claim or from a colossal
regulatory failing – may not prove to be a risk for
the whole organisation because of the structure
used. As an example, the $456 million fine im-
posed on KPMG in the USA in 2005 for criminal
tax violations55 did not appear to have conse-
quences for other member firms in the international
organisation. There is, then, some evidence that
this structure works for this ring-fencing purpose.
There is another reason why the structure
adopted may be of significant value to the whole
organisation. The structure adopted allows each
member firm to argue that it only has liability to its
own clients and to its own regulators. But this also
means it can ring-fence disclosure to regulators
outside its own jurisdiction, whether for tax or other
purposes. 
As a result the maintenance of client confidential-
ity in the face of regulatory
investigation is much easier
to secure for two reasons.
The first is that if there is only
an obligation to local regula-
tors; the risk of cross-border
investigation of almost any
sort is reduced. Secondly,
this diversified structure
means that a client of one
part of KPMG may well not
be a client of another part of
KPMG. As a result the
chance that an enquiry can
be safely replied to with the
assurance that no broader
data is held is greatly in-
creased.
Given the need for unifor-
mity in standards in the op-
eration of an international
firm of auditors, advisers and tax specialists the
adoption of a legally diversified structure for a firm
must suggest that there are very strong reasons
for doing this when there is in almost every other
market a near-universal adoption of centralised
models of ownership, management and control. 
We suggest that the three above-noted reasons –
of limiting regulatory and legal liability risk whilst
ring-fencing client activity from enquiry – provide
an explanation for the use of non-standard struc-
tures by the Big Four firms of accountants whilst
also suggesting that a change in regulation is
needed if greater accountability is to be demanded
from these firms.
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In this chapter we suggest that the Big Four firms
operate a structure that at one level suggests the
existence of a globally integrated firm whilst actu-
ally being made up of numerous separate legal en-
tities that are not under common ownership but
which are bound by contractual arrangements to
operate common standards under a common
name because this structure:
n reduces their regulatory cost and risk;
n ring-fences their legal risk;
n protects their clients from
regulatory enquiries;
n provides opacity on the true
scale of their operations and the
rewards flowing from them.
We presume that these benefits
outweigh the cost of organising
the firms in this way. 
To counter the risk that these
structures impose on society we
suggest that:
n Firms organised in this way be defined as being
under common control, and so are single entities
for group accounting purposes within the Euro-
pean Union;
n These firms should be licensed as single enti-
ties for audit and taxation purposes throughout the
European Union;
n These firms should be required in due course
to separate entirely their audit and other profes-
sional services but until this is possible should be
required to ring-fence the two from each other
worldwide as a condition of being licenced to pro-
vide such services in the EU; 
n As a condition of those licences they should be
required to prepare worldwide group consolidated
financial statements which must be published on
public record;
n Those consolidated financial statements
should include full public country-by-country 
reporting.
A. DISCUSSION
Like all systems global capitalism cannot survive
without regulation. The absence of regulation in
capitalism does not create ‘free markets’. Market
failures create opportunities for abuse that denies
free access to markets, permits excess profit, mis-
allocates capital, encourages
monopolies, permits unde-
tected fraud and denies con-
sumers choice. None of
these outcomes are socially
or economically beneficial. 
Auditors play a critical role
in global capitalism. They
alone decide if the accounts
(or financial statements) of a
company are true and fair. In
the process of undertaking
this task auditors also have a
duty to examine whether or
not the books and records of the company are suf-
ficient to support this purpose. Whilst doing so
they are not explicitly tasked with looking for fraud,
but if a fraud is likely to create risk for the firm as a
whole it is expected that they should identify it. The
important point for the current purpose is that no-
one else, tax authorities included, has this routine
access to company data. 
The auditor’s role is, then, unique. Appointed by
the management of the company and paid from its
resources, an auditor’s duty is to the company’s
shareholders. In some situations, when solvency is
at risk, that duty can go further: the auditor can
also have a duty to creditors. That duty quite ex-
plicitly extends to tax authorities, who are often
major creditors of many companies. 
This duty is also implicit in another aspect of the
auditor’s work. As this report has shown, tax ad-
vice constitutes a major part of the income of the
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largest four audit firms in the world. Some of that
income will be earned for providing advice on how
to structure transactions for tax purposes, usually
with the intention of minimising liabilities. To the ex-
tent that liabilities are minimised by reducing the
risk that the company inadvertently breaks the law
this activity is of real social value and to be encour-
aged56. 
When, alternatively, that advice deliberately seeks
to exploit uncertainties, ambiguities and inconsis-
tencies in the law of a country, or between the law
of countries, and in the process seeks to exploit
the secrecy that some jurisdictions provide, this ac-
tivity moves from being socially useful to socially
harmful, even if the law is not broken. 
That harm comes from the creation of the risk
that tax liabilities may not be appropriately stated.
This risk, which may well be quite deliberately hid-
den from view, arises to the company itself, its ad-
visers (in the event that they are sued), the
investors in the company who are unacquainted
with the risk that they might be assuming, and to
society at large as a result of the resulting unpaid
tax. 
This unpaid tax can result from the interaction of
tax and accounting. Audit firms state that their
clients’ accounts are true and fair. Tax systems rely
upon this assurance: there is not a corporation tax
system in the world that does not start its assess-
ment of company profits subject to tax without ex-
amining the accounting profit of the entities in
question57. If that assurance is not true and fair
then the corporate tax base is at risk. Auditors
have an implicit duty to make sure that this is not
the case. 
This implicit obligation, however, highlights a par-
adoxical situation. Auditors are in the most extraor-
dinary and unique position of being both regulators
and simultaneously providers of commercial advice
on the abuse of legal systems in the current system
of global capitalism. 
As many have pointed out for a considerable pe-
riod of time58, this creates conflicts of interest that
need to be addressed. The obvious solution is to
split audit firms from those providing any other
services. If that cannot be achieved in the short
term the tax and other activities of these firms have
to be firmly ring-fenced from each other worldwide
if an audit licence is to be granted to a network
member in the EU: anything less leads to conflicts
of interest that in any other regulatory environment
would be considered wholly unacceptable. 
The fact is that auditors are appointed as a result
of a legal requirement to a task whose function is
prescribed by law and which confers both excep-
tional legal privilege and the opportunity to earn
substantial profit. This function is, however, regu-
lated nationally. This basis for regulation is
premised on the legal fiction that each company
within a multinational corporation is a separate
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legal entity capable of being audited largely within
the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated – even
though the whole economic nature of the multina-
tional corporation, and the consolidated accounts
it produces, reflect the fact that such organisations
are in fact single entities that are managed as such,
including with regard to risk – and that the subdi-
visions into separate corporate
entities within them is solely for
legal and management con-
venience. The very existence of
consolidated accounts, which
are in a legal sense works of
fiction because there is no ac-
tual entity that undertakes the
transactions that they record,
recognises the conflicts inher-
ent in all aspects of accounting
(including that for tax)  between
legal form and economic sub-
stance. 
The accounting profession
has largely resolved these par-
adoxical conflicts in favour of
economic substance. Consolidated financial state-
ments are evidence of that. So too is the account-
ing requirement that the legal form of many lease
contracts be ignored for accounting purposes. 
We suggest that if this process of ignoring legal
form is appropriate for accounting then it is also
appropriate for the process of regulating auditors.
Ddespite the fact that the legal form of many of the
world’s largest auditors allows them to claim that
they are a network of independent entities without
legal commitment to each other, this should be ig-
nored for regulatory purposes and EU law should
be changed to give effect to this proposal. 
As we show in this report, the reality is that the
Big Four firms all have entities that coordinate, reg-
ulate and manage the activities of the firms that
very obviously work together under a common
name for a common purpose to service clients that
they very often have in common. As we have also
shown with our case study of KPMG, it is not clear
that all firms are equal within these networks. Nor
is it even apparent who all the firms within those
networks are, let alone where they operate. 
The consequence is that the world’s auditors,
who play a critical role on which we all at present
depend in managing the risks within global capi-
talism, enjoy enormous opacity around the work
that they do, who actually does it, where they do
it, and for what reward.
In our opinion this is an inappropriate situation.
The price of being a regulator must be that you be
regulated. The price of being a regulator tasked
with delivering accountability
must be that you be transpar-
ent wherever you work. We ex-
pect this in the state sector and
we should expect the same of
those appointed as a result of
legal requirement. It follows
then that when the truth and
fairness of tax and accounting
can only be determined by au-
dits, those firms given the op-
portunity to earn exceptional
profits from providing audit
services must themselves be
subject to the highest degree
of scrutiny, including being reg-
ulated internationally as the
global entities they in fact are. 
The world is now realising that the real scale of
tax and accounting risk can only be appraised on
a country-by-country basis and that this local ap-
proach must be reconciled to a global understand-
ing of what entities do as a whole. We share that
view. As a consequence we think that it is only on
a country-by-country reporting basis that fully rec-
onciles with their global results that the risk that the
Big Four firms and their smaller competitors create
be properly appraised. 
The Big Four are only able to operate in the way
that they do because regulation permits it. Two
regulations are at fault. One is with regard to audit
regulation. The regulation of auditors (and tax prac-
titioners) is devolved within the European Union. As
the 2014 Directive on this issue says59:
“
Each Member State shall designate the com-
petent authority to be responsible for approv-
ing statutory auditors and audit firms.
The structure used exploits this to devolve the
regulation of the Big Four to many different author-
ities. This clearly does not work: the claim by the
Big Four firms that they are networks of separate
entities gets around this regulation and prevents
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EU-wide registration of these firms.
The second regulation that is exploited is that on
what constitutes a group for accounting purposes,
which is also set by the European Union. The 2013
directive on the issue of financial statements re-
quires the production of group accounts by a 
parent undertaking that controls subsidiary under-
takings60. Control is the key word in this context.
Sub-paragraph 31 of the preamble to the 2013 Di-
rective61 says that control should be based on
holding a majority of voting rights, but that “control
may also exist where there are agreements with fel-
low shareholders or members” and that  “in certain
circumstances control may be effectively exercised
where the parent holds a minority or none of the
shares in the subsidiary”. It also says that “Member
States should be entitled to require that undertak-
ings not subject to control, but which are managed
on a unified basis or have a common administra-
tive, managerial or supervisory body, be included
in consolidated financial statements”. 
It should also be noted that there are weaknesses
in the EU’s proposed new system for beating tax
abuse promoted by tax advisers. This proposal62
will require that advisers report tax schemes that
may potentially be abusive. The arrangements in
question do not, however, recognise networked
firms as single entities or extend the obligations of
EU member firms to their network partners outside
the EU’s territorial limits. Both are essential if the
regulation is to be effective.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Bearing these regulatory abuses in mind we
make four recommendations. 
RECOMMENDATION 1
First, we recommend that in due course, and
making provision for a transitional period during
which change can take place, all audit firms be re-
quired to be entirely separate from those selling
any other service. Only in this way can the conflicts
of interest inherent in the current structure of the
Big Four firms of accountants and other, smaller
but similar networks, be eliminated. During the
transition to this outcome the audit and other func-
tions of these firms need to be entirely ring-fenced
from each other within the operation of the firms in
question. Inspection of the effectiveness of this
ring-fencing throughout the network should be a
consideration for the grant of an audit licence
within the European Union. 
RECOMMENDATION 2
The second recommendation is aimed directly at
improving transparency. We suggest that despite
the fact that the legal form of many of the world’s
largest accountancy practices allows them to claim
under existing regulations that they are a network
of independent entities without legal commitment
to each other that this should be ignored for regu-
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latory purposes. 
This could be achieved within the EU’s existing
definition of the control required to create a group
of companies as noted above if it was made clear
that a professional services firm that is a member
of a network of firms associated by legally enforce-
able contractual arrangements that provide for the
sharing of a name or marketing, professional stan-
dards, clients, support services, finance or profes-
sional indemnity insurance arrangements is
deemed to be a member of group of companies
(whatever its own legal form) that operates under
common control even if there is no common own-
ership. This situation has, as noted above, already
been anticipated by the 2013 Directive on financial
statements. 
Note that this recommendation would survive any
split in these firms between audit and other serv-
ices: this recommendation should apply to net-
works of professional firms of all types. The largest
EU-based entity within that network would then be
deemed to be the parent entity for these purposes
unless another member accepted that obligation.
That parent entity would then be required to file
consolidated accounts for the worldwide organi-
sation of which it was a member on public record.
Failure to do so would result in a denial of licences
to provide audit and taxation services throughout
the EU. 
RECOMMENDATION 3
Thirdly, we suggest that any network of profes-
sional services firms impacted by our first recom-
mendation be required to apply for a single licence
to provide audit and taxation services of any sort
throughout the EU member states. This can be
quite easily achieved within existing EU regulatory
frameworks by making clear that the firm is the net-
work and not the individual operating entity that
happens to supply services in a member state. The
implication of this recommendation with regard to
tax is that all abusive tax schemes promoted by
the firm that impact on the tax revenues of any EU
member state should be reported whether sold by
a network member within or outside the EU.   
When granting that licence the regulator tasked
with oversight for this purpose should be allowed
to take into consideration, and make enquiries
about, the activities of that network wherever they
occur in the world. In the process the regulator
should be able to place conditions on the grant of
licences to curtail activities that are not considered
to be undertaken in the public interest, whether
they are directly related to audit or taxation or not,
but where they might imperil the registered firm’s
reputation and ability to deliver professional serv-
ices of a standard that the public should expect.
This could, of course, include participation in the
promotion of tax havens, the sale of tax advice and
other such activities.
RECOMMENDATION 4
Fourthly, to support this regulatory process and
to hold these networks of professional service firms
to account we recommend that the professional
networks subject to these arrangements be re-
quired to file full country-by-country reports,
adapted to meet the particular needs of this sector,
on public record. The required disclosure should
be:
A set of global consolidated financial statements
for all the entities associated with it by common li-
cence arrangements intended to regulate its use
of a common name, network or standards whether
or not those entities are for the purposes of current
relevant local accounting or legal requirements
considered to be under common control;
The names of those entities joining or leaving the
common licence arrangement during the course of
the year; the reason for their doing so and the
name of the jurisdiction in which they had a licence
to operate;
The following country-by-country reporting data
(which must reconcile with the previously noted
global consolidated financial statements) for each
jurisdiction, without exception, in which taxable ac-
tivity reflected in those financial statements arises:
n The name of the jurisdiction;
n The name of the associated entities trading in
that location;
n The beneficial ownership of the entities in ques-
tion;
n The names of the directors, partners or other
persons tasked with management of those enti-
ties;
n The third party sales of those entities on a con-
solidated basis by jurisdiction split between audit,
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tax and consulting sources;
n The intra-associated entity sales;
n The number of full-time-equivalent employees
in the jurisdiction;
n The cost of employment of those full-time-
equivalent employees;
n The number of partners, directors or other per-
sons with management responsibility engaged in
the jurisdiction with a note as to their total com-
bined remuneration and whether that cost is in-
cluded in total salary expense, or not;
n The profit before tax;
n Taxes due on profits for the period;
n Taxes on profits paid in the year;
n Total capital employed in the jurisdiction at the
close of the period;
n What professional indemnity insurance cover
are in place to protect against claims arising;
n The names of the agencies responsible for reg-
ulating the entities operating in the jurisdiction;
n Details of the licencing arrangements in oper-
ation throughout the associated network as a
whole including:
n In which jurisdiction the principle entity that
grants the right to membership of the associated
network is located;
n How that principle entity is owned and con-
trolled;
n Who serves on the board that controls that
principle entity and how they are appointed;
n The terms of the licences issued by the princi-
ple entity to the operating entity in each jurisdiction
in which the network has an operation including
those licence arrangements that cover multiple ju-
risdictions and those that grant a licence that in
turn permits sub-licences to be granted, and how
those arrangements are structured in practice;
n Which organisation(s), if any, regulate the prin-
ciple entity;
n The fines, penalties or professional misconduct
rulings made against member firms in the associ-
ated network, specifying the jurisdiction involved
during the course of the year.
Such reporting does not resolve all the issues that
arise in regulating the operation of the Big Four ac-
counting firms and their smaller competitors but
what it does make clear is:
n Who these firms are;
n Where they are;
n How they are managed;
n Who they are managed by;
n Where the balance of economic significance
lies within these entities;
n The scale of their tax-haven activities;
n What resources these firms have available to
manage their own risk. 
With this data and the changes that we recom-
mend EU-based regulators will be able to make
more informed decisions when granting licences
to the Big Four and other international networks of
professional services firms to better control the
risks that they pose to society as a result of the ac-
tivities that they undertake.
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There is no definitive list of tax havens, or secrecy jurisdictions, on which all authorities
agree. In our opinion the best-researched source is the TJN Financial Secrecy Index, most
recently published in 201563. The research is based on a rigorous analysis of official data
and detailed survey work as well as econometric analyses. 
For the purposes of our work all of those locations with secrecy scores of 65 and above in
the 2015 Financial Secrecy Index have been treated as secrecy jurisdictions. These are as
follows, with the number of Big Four offices in each being shown:
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In addition the following locations are all considered based on widespread evidence to
have significant secrecy jurisdiction characteristics and as such are also included in our list
for these purposes:
This makes a total of 53 jurisdictions that have been recognised as secrecy jurisdictions
for the purposes of this report. 
financial secrecy 
index ranking
Jurisdiction  financial 
secrecy score  
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